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BLD-167        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3948 
___________ 
 
JOHN PETRUCELLI, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KRISTIN RUSIN, Court reporter 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 4-14-cv-01214) 
District Judge Matthew W. Brann  
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 3, 2016 
 
Before:  FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 8, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se appellant John Petrucelli appeals from the judgment of the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania in his § 1983 action.  As the appeal 
does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
 Petrucelli initiated this § 1983 action in 2014 against Kristin Rusin, the court 
reporter during a number of Petrucelli’s criminal hearings in the Southern District of New 
York, where Petrucelli was sentenced to life in prison in 2003 on murder and 
racketeering charges.  Petrucelli alleges that Rusin altered, destroyed, or incompletely 
transcribed audio recordings from his hearings, depriving him the ability to raise certain 
issues on appeal.  Petrucelli filed this action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 
where he is currently incarcerated at FCI-Allenwood.  Rusin, who currently resides in 
Nevada and claims to have no contacts with Middle District of Pennsylvania, filed a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on March 17, 2015.  On October 19, 
2015 the Magistrate Judge recommended that Rusin’s motion be granted, and in a 
November 19, 2015 order, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation in 
full, over Petrucelli’s objections, and directed the Clerk to close the case.  Petrucelli filed 
a timely notice of appeal from this order on December 9, 2015.  Our Clerk advised 
Petrucelli that his appeal faced dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or summary action and 
invited him to file a response.  He has done so. 
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II. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review a district court's 
decision that it possesses or lacks personal jurisdiction de novo [but review] factual 
findings . . . for clear error.”  Telcordia Tech Inc. v. Telkom SA Ltd., 458 F.3d 172, 176 
(3d Cir. 2006).  We may summarily affirm the District Court where “it clearly appears 
that no substantial question is presented or that subsequent precedent or a change in 
circumstances warrants such action.” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6 (2015).  
 When a defendant challenges a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in a 
12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction by a 
preponderance of the evidence and must do so by “establishing with reasonable 
particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum state.” Mellon Bank 
(East) PSFS, Nat’l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) authorizes federal courts to exercise 
“personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent permissible under the 
law of the state where the district court sits.” Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., 
Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998).  Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute permits courts to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants “to the fullest extent allowed 
under the Constitution of the United States” and “based on the most minimum contact 
with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5322(b).  
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a non-resident 
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defendant have certain minimum contacts with a forum state – contacts that would 
provide the defendant “fair warning” that he might be sued there – before a federal court 
in that forum can constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over that defendant. 
Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). 
 Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific; “[g]eneral jurisdiction exists 
when a defendant has maintained systematic and continuous contacts with the forum 
state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007).  Specific jurisdiction, on the 
other hand, requires a court to conduct a three-part inquiry: “First, the defendant must 
have purposefully directed [its] activities at the forum. Second, the litigation must arise 
out of or relate to at least one of those activities. And third, if the prior two requirements 
are met, a court may consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise comport[s] 
with fair play and substantial justice.” O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 
312, 317 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 Here, with respect to general jurisdiction, the District Court found that the facts 
plead indicated that Rusin has systematic contact with only the states of New York and 
Nevada – she resided in New York during Petrucelli’s criminal proceedings and then 
relocated to Reno, Nevada.  The facts indicate no contact with Pennsylvania.   
 As to specific jurisdiction, the District Court accurately observed that the 
complained-of conduct was directed at New York – the state of Petrucelli’s criminal 
proceedings – and that the only connection Petrucelli’s criminal proceeding has with the 
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Middle District of Pennsylvania is that he is now, thirteen years after his conviction, 
serving a portion of his life sentence at FCI-Allenwood. 
 We have nothing to add to the District Court’s reasoning.1  Because it is plain that 
the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over Rusin, we will summarily affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.   
                                              
1 We have considered Petrucelli’s arguments on appeal, but are unpersuaded by them. 
